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Identity Crisis: Class Certification, 
Aggregate Proof, and How Rule 23 
May Be Self-Defeating the Policy for 
Which It Was Established 
 
J. Britton Whitbeck* 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Class actions suits developed in the United States as a form of 
“group litigation,” an alternative to the impracticability or inequities of 
separate, individual actions of a similarly situated class of plaintiffs and, 
eventually, defendants. Congressional passage of the Class Action 
Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA) provided the federal courts with 
expounded diversity jurisdiction for the purpose of “assur[ing] fairer 
outcomes for class members and defendants.” However, recent circuit 
splits regarding class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure (FRCP) and the use of aggregate proof in certifying 
classes have, in an ironic twist of legal fate, resulted in the very same 
“inconsistent or varying” standards that the rule was designed to prevent. 
 
II.  The Origins and History of Class Action Litigation 
 
A class action is “an action in which a representative plaintiff sues 
or a representative defendant is sued on behalf of a class of plaintiffs or 
defendants who have the same interests in the litigation as their 
representative and whose rights or liabilities can be more efficiently 
determined as a group than in a series of individual suits.”1 Class action 
suits are a derivative form of “group litigation,” which existed as a part 
of English common law since the Middle Ages and was imported to the 
 
        *   J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law. The Author would 
like to thank Julienne and his family for their support; Federal Magistrate Judge Jeffrey 
L. Cureton and Professor Marc I. Steinberg for their academic and professional guidance; 
and the late Richard A. Nagareda, whose scholarship on class actions has provided 
inestimable insight to academics, practitioners, and the United States Supreme Court. 
1. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY OF LAW 80-81 (1996). 
1
WHITBECK_Final_Formattedv1 6/5/2012  9:07 AM 
2012] IDENTITY CRISIS 489 
United States by Justice Joseph Story in the early nineteenth century.
2
 
Most notably, as a federal judge on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Circuit of Rhode Island (the modern-day United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit), Justice Story wrote the opinion in West v. 
Randall, in which he stated: “It is a general rule in equity, that all persons 
materially interested, either as plaintiffs or defendants in the subject 
matter of the bill ought to be made parties to the suit, however numerous 
they may be.”3 
Modern-day class actions are governed by Rule 23 of the FRCP, 
which was first adopted in 1938, and was amended in 1966 to preclude 
civil action litigation from “supplement[ing] the role of] regulatory 
agencies,”4 and as a result of civil rights legislation.5 Although “[s]tate 
rules generally mirrored the federal rule . . . ‘entrepreneurial’ class action 
lawyers increasingly filed class actions in state courts” in order to game 
the legal system by filing in plaintiff-friendly states.
6
 The inconsistent 
and varying standards of these courts frustrated the development of 
comity within the body of law. 
CAFA 
7
 was enacted as a measure of tort reform, amending and 
expanding federal diversity jurisdiction primarily to reduce “forum 
shopping” among plaintiff-friendly state courts. In addition, it aimed to 
reform coupon settlements to discourage ambitious plaintiffs’ attorneys 
from seeking out tenuous claims that were otherwise void of any 
substantial economic benefit to individual class members. Such tenuous 
claims had resulted in excessive attorneys’ fees, and cost corporations 
millions of dollars in damage awards and settlement costs (despite such 
claims lacking in merit or being otherwise untriable on an individual 
basis).
8
 The stated purpose of the legislation was “to amend the 
procedures that apply to consideration of interstate class actions to assure 
fairer outcomes for class members and defendants, and for other 
purposes.”9 Although CAFA has succeeded in directing national and 
 
2. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN 
CLASS ACTION 38, 216-20 (1987). 
3. 29 F. Cas. 718, 721 (C.C.D.R.I. 1820). 
4. YEAZELL, supra note 2, at 232 (citing Harry Kalven, Jr.& Maurice Rosenfeld, 
The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 721 (1941)). 
5. Id. at 240. 
6. Edward F. Sherman, Class Actions After the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 
80 TUL. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (2006). 
7. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified as amended at various sections of 
28 U.S.C. (2006)). 
8. See generally id. See also Sherman, supra note 6, at 1593, 1614-15. 
9. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/9
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multistate actions into federal courts, thereby decreasing inconsistency 
among class actions between federal and state courts, recent circuit splits 
regarding class certification under Rule 23 of the FRCP and the use of 
aggregate proof in certifying classes has threatened such consistency. 
 
III.  Class Certification 
 
A.  Rule 23 
 
FRCP Rule 23(a) states that members of a class may sue as 
representatives of all members only if the class meets the prerequisites of 
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation.
10
 
To maintain a class action, the class must meet all of the Rule 23(a) 
prerequisites, as well as one of the following conditions under Rule 
23(b): (1) prosecuting separate, individual actions “would create a risk of 
. . . inconsistent or varying adjudications . . . that would establish 
incompatible standards of conduct” of opposing parties, or would 
otherwise be dispositive to, impede, or substantially impair the interest of 
other class members; (2) the opposing party’s actions or refusal to act 
“appl[ies] generally to the class, so that final injunctive or corresponding 
declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as whole; or” (3) 
common questions of law or fact among class members “predominate 
over any questions affecting only individual members” and “class action 
is superior to other available methods for . . . adjudicating the 
controversy.”11 
 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to 
the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims 
or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately 
protect the interests of the class.”). 
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). See also Sherman, supra note 6, at 1593-94 (The 1966 
“amendment created two new class action categories: a Rule 23(b)(2) class action for 
injunction or declaratory relief against defendants who had acted on grounds applicable 
to the class, and a Rule 23(b)(3) class action for money damages on behalf of a grouping 
of persons who had a question of law or fact in common. The former lead to the civil 
rights and institutional reform class actions of the 1970s and 1980s that resulted in 
significant changes in certain practices of both governmental institutions and private 
businesses. The latter lead initially to class actions based on federal laws such as antitrust, 
securities fraud, and employment discrimination, but, by the 1980s and 1990s, migrated 
to a broad spectrum of commercial, consumer protection, environmental, product 
liability, and mass tort cases.”) (internal citations omitted). 
3
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After the 1966 amendments, district courts struggled with how to 
determine whether a class met the prerequisites and conditions of Rule 
23, especially given that some factors included a preliminary review of 
evidence.
12
 Even within the circuits, sister district courts issued 
polarizing opinions, some endorsing full evidentiary reviews on the 
merits and others rejecting any kind of review of certification 
requirements if the question rested even partially on the merits of the 
case.
13
 
 
B.  Eisen Rule and Falcon 
 
In Eisen v. Carlise & Jacquelin, the Supreme Court was confronted 
with the evidentiary issue and held that “[t]here is nothing in either the 
language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct 
a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine 
whether it may be maintained as a class action.”14 Here, the Court found 
improper the district court’s use of a preliminary hearing on the merits to 
determine the appropriateness of shifting from the representative plaintiff 
to the defendant the onerous and prohibitive cost
15
 of notice to other 
class members.
16
 The Court based its finding on an opinion by Judge 
Wisdom of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 
stating: “In determining the propriety of a class action, the question is not 
whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have stated a cause of action or will 
prevail on the merits, but rather whether the requirements of Rule 23 are 
met.”17 Eisen quickly became the standard rule, precluding a preliminary 
 
12. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive 
Merits, 15 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1263-64 (2002). 
13. See id. (citing Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Mersay v. 
First Republic Corp. of Am., 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968)). 
14. 417 U.S. 156, 156-58 (1974). 
15. Expenses for notice were two hundred and twenty-five thousand dollars, and the 
individual claim of the representative plaintiff was seventy dollars. See id. at 157, 161, 
167. 
16. See id. at 157, 165, 166. 
17. Id. at 178 (citing Miller v. Mackey Int’l, Inc., 452 F.2d 424, 427 (5th Cir. 
1971)). In Miller, Judge Wisdom further stated: 
 
Rule 23 delineates the scope of inquiry to be exercised by a district 
judge in passing on a class action motion. Nothing in that Rule 
indicates the necessity or the propriety of an inquiry into the merits. 
Indeed, there is absolutely no support in the history of Rule 23 or 
legal precedent for turning a motion under Rule 23 into a Rule 12 
motion to dismiss or a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment by 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/9
WHITBECK_Final_Formattedv1 6/5/2012  9:07 AM 
492 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:2 
review of the merits of a case at class certification, including those cases 
where such a review would identify frivolous or weak class action suits 
and, more importantly, those cases that do not satisfy the requirements 
and conditions of Rule 23.
18
 
Although the rule was broadly accepted, judges were still faced with 
the same evidentiary determinations in ensuring compliance with Rule 
23. The Supreme Court, in General Telephone Co. of the Southwest v. 
Falcon, again citing the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit, noted “[t]he need to carefully apply the requirements of Rule 
23(a).”19 Here, the Court rejected a class certification for racial 
discrimination, where the plaintiff who alleged discrimination in 
promotion failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish a common 
connection between alleged discriminatory promotion practices and 
alleged discriminatory hiring practices, and therefore failed to establish 
the commonality prerequisite of Rule 23(a).
20
 The Court effectively 
disavowed the across-the-board rule, which recognized racial 
discrimination as class discrimination, that some courts used to bypass 
the requirements of Rule 23.
21
 The Court held that a class action “may 
only be certified if the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, 
that the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) have been satisfied.”22 District courts 
were forced to reconcile the “rigorous analysis” required in Falcon with 
the Eisen rule, and while the courts agreed upon the difficulty of their 
dilemma,
23
 there was no such unison among the circuits as to its 
 
allowing the district judge to evaluate the possible merit of the 
plaintiff's claims at this stage of the proceedings. Failure to state a 
cause of action is entirely distinct from failure to state a class action. 
 
452 F.2d at 428. 
18. See Bone & Evans, supra note 12, at 1265-66. 
19. 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 417 
F.2d 1122, 1125-27 (5th Cir. 1969)). 
20. Id. at 160 (“The District Court’s error in this case . . . is the failure to evaluate 
carefully the legitimacy of the named plaintiff’s plea that he is a proper class 
representative under Rule 23(a).”). 
21. See id. at 157. 
22. Id. at 161. 
23. See Eggleston v. Chi. Journeyman Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 
890, 895 (7th Cir. 1981) (“We have noted that the boundary between a class 
determination and the merits may not always be easily discernible.”); Stastny v. S. Bell 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 267, 275 (4th Cir. 1980) (“The resulting difficulty of making a 
fair determination of class action status in advance of trial on the merits in these cases 
produces a dilemma for trial courts that is well known and for which no happy general 
solution has yet been, or is likely to be, found.”). 
5
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solution.
24
 
 
C.  Circuit Split 
 
1. Rigorous Analysis 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on, 
but also differentiating its case from, Falcon,
25
 held in Castano v. Am. 
Tobacco Company, that “[a] district court certainly may look past the 
pleadings to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 have been 
met . . . [and this] is necessary, as a court must understand the claims, 
defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law in order to make 
a meaningful determination of the certification issues.”26 Here, the court 
rejected a class certification because the district court failed to properly 
consider the effect of state law on the “predominance” of common 
questions of law or fact and the “superiority” of class action as required 
in Rule 23(b)(3).
27
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in 
Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., rejected the twin notions that a court 
may not delve into the facts of a case to determine if it is proper for class 
action litigation and, with regards to class certification, that the plaintiff’s 
pleadings should be accepted as true.
28
 The court determined that prior to 
class certification, “a judge should make whatever factual and legal 
inquiries are necessary under Rule 23.”29 “[S]ometimes it may be 
necessary for the court to probe beyond the pleadings before coming to 
rest on the certification question.”30 
But the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in 
Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, provided the greatest departure from the 
standard Eisen rule, holding that Eisen “does not mean that consideration 
 
24. See Bone & Evans, supra note 12, at 1268. 
25. See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996) ("In Eisen, 
the Court held that it was improper to make a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a 
case, determine that the plaintiff was likely to succeed, and consequently shift the cost of 
providing notice to the defendant."). 
26. Id. 
27. See id. at 745-46. 
28. 249 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The proposition that a district judge must 
accept all of the complaint’s allegations when deciding whether to certify a class cannot 
be found in Rule 23 and has nothing to recommend it.”). 
29. Id. at 676. 
30. Id. at 677 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160 (1982)). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/9
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of facts necessary to a Rule 23 determination is foreclosed merely 
because they are required to be proved as part of the merits.”31 The court 
held such determinations: 
 
[M]ust focus on the requirements of the rule, and if 
findings made in connection with those requirements 
overlap findings that will have to be made on the merits, 
such overlap is only coincidental . . . [and] serve the 
court only in its determination of whether the 
requirements of Rule 23 have been demonstrated.
32
 
 
Furthermore, Gariety emphasized the requirement of the court to issue 
findings as to whether the case meets the prerequisites and conditions of 
Rule 23.
33
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, relying on 
Falcon and building on Gariety, held in Unger v. Amedisys Inc. that 
courts must apply “rigorous, though preliminary, standards of proof” to 
ensure compliance with Rule 23.
34
 Further, the court stated in Bell v. 
Ascendant Solutions, Inc. that to deny the requirement of such a standard 
“betrays a mis-reading of Eisen, which . . . does not suggest that a court 
is limited to the pleadings when deciding on class certification.”35 
Instead, Eisen “stands for the unremarkable proposition that to the 
description of this the strength of a plaintiff’s claim should not affect the 
certification decision.”36 Both Unger and Bell dealt with securities fraud 
cases, where the plaintiff class of investors failed to establish sufficient 
evidence to support a rebuttable presumption of an “efficient market” as 
required to support the fraud-on-the-market doctrine
37
 and thereby failed 
 
31. 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004). 
32. Id. 
33. Id. (“Thus, while an evaluation of the merits to determine the strength of 
plaintiffs’ case is not part of a Rule 23 analysis, the factors spelled out in Rule 23 must be 
addressed through findings, even if they overlap with issues on the merits.”). 
34. 401 F.3d 316, 322 (5th Cir. 2005). 
35. 422 F.3d 307, 311 (5th Cir. 2005). 
36. Id. (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996)). 
37. See generally Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988). In Levinson, the 
Supreme Court articulated the fraud-on-the-market doctrine—the notion that, in a 
securities fraud case, an efficient market gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of reliance 
as required for a 10b-5 claim. In a class action, the presumption establishes reliance for 
the class as a whole. See id. Without it, a plaintiff class in a 10b-5 case could not be 
certified because the questions of law and fact for a showing of reliance by each plaintiff 
would be individualized and predominate over common issues, and, most likely, the 
7
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to establish the class-wide reliance element required to certify the class 
of a 10b-5 claim.
38
 Unger also authorized full discovery to ensure 
compliance with the conditions and requirements of Rule 23.
39
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
attributed the confusion of lower courts regarding Falcon to a misreading 
of Eisen by the very same courts.
40
 The court, in IPO, aligned itself with 
“Szabo, Gariety, and all other decisions” permitting an inquiry into the 
merits of a case when determining class certification.
41
 And while the 
IPO court resisted the call for requiring “findings,” the court did require 
a “definitive assessment of Rule 23 requirements, notwithstanding their 
overlap with merits issues.”42 The court concluded that: a determination 
must be made as to whether “each of the Rule 23 requirements has been 
met;” the district judge must “resolve[] any factual disputes relevant to 
each of the Rule 23 requirements;” such obligation “is not lessened by 
overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a merits issues;” and while 
the district judge may not evaluate any merits issues “unrelated to a Rule 
23 requirement,” he has broad “discretion” as to the scope and extent of 
any “discovery” or “hearing[s]” necessary to “determine whether [the] 
requirements are met.”43 In doing so, the IPO court rejected the use of a 
“some showing” standard—disavowing its own precedents implying 
such a standard, as well as the assertion that expert testimony may 
establish a component of Rule 23 merely by not being “fatally flawed.”44 
 
claims and defenses would also be individualized as well. See id. 
38. See Unger, 401 F.3d at 322; Bell, 422 F.3d at 312. 
39. Unger, 401 F.3d at 321 (“To assist the court in this process it may sanction 
controlled discovery at the certification stage. The plain text of Rule 23 requires the court 
to ‘find,’ not merely assume, the facts favoring class certification. Rule 23(b)(3).”). See 
also FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note. 
40. Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 
24, 33-34 (2d Cir. 2006) 
41. Id. at 41. 
42. Id. at 40 (“We resist saying that what are required are ‘findings’ because that 
word usually implies that a district judge is resolving a disputed issue of fact. Although 
there are often factual disputes in connection with Rule 23 requirements . . . the ultimate 
issue as to each requirement is really a mixed question of fact and law. A legal standard, 
e.g., numerosity, commonality, or predominance, is being applied to a set of facts . . . 
which might be in dispute. The Rule 23 requirements are threshold issues, similar in 
some respects to preliminary issues such as personal or subject matter jurisdiction. We 
normally do not say that a district court makes a ‘finding’ of subject matter jurisdiction; 
rather, the district court makes a ‘ruling’ or a ‘determination’ as to whether such 
jurisdiction exists.”). 
43. Id. at 41. 
44. Id. at 42. 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/9
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The court also rejected any notion that prevents the court from weighing 
conflicting evidence related to class certification merely because the 
evidence also involves an issue on the merits.
45
 
The IPO court reached its decision to require a “definitive 
assessment,” rather than “findings,” partly on the basis of a prior 
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit.
46
 The 
First Circuit, In re Polymedica Securities Litigation, agreed with the 
“majority view” that a district judge is “entitled to look beyond the 
pleadings and consider evidence” in determining whether or not a case 
meets the requirements of Rule 23 for class certification.
47
 In 
Polymedica, the court held that “the question of how much evidence of 
efficiency” is necessary for the applicability of the fraud-on-the-market 
doctrine’s presumption of reliance was “one of degree,” noting that its 
use of “generalities” would not settle the question, but was “the best we 
can do.”48 The First Circuit later, in New Motor Vehicles, wholly 
endorsed the rigorous review as to the requirements and conditions of 
Rule 23 as required by the other circuits.
49
 The court, in reviewing a 
denial of class certification, determined that the district court rightly 
conducted discovery and a “searching inquiry” into the merits of the case 
when evaluating and weighing competing expert testimony as to the 
predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).
50
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit initially 
held that “[a] class certification decision requires a thorough examination 
of the factual and legal allegations.”51 The court referred to the class 
 
45. See id. 
46. See id. at 39. 
47. 432 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005). 
48. See id. at 17. 
49. See Brown v. Am. Honda (In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust 
Litig.), 522 F.3d 6, 25-26 (1st Cir. 2008) (“PolyMedica . . . could be read, but we think 
not properly, as limiting this requirement that district courts probe into the viability of the 
premises of plaintiffs’ theory of injury to cases employing only legal presumptions of 
injury. Under this circuit’s approach, in our view, a searching inquiry is in order where 
there are not only disputed basic facts, but also a novel theory of legally cognizable 
injury.”). 
50. See id. at 26 (“We do not need to resolve now whether ‘findings’ regarding the 
class certification criteria are ever necessary, but we do hold that when a Rule 23 
requirement relies on a novel or complex theory as to injury, as the predominance inquiry 
does in this case, the district court must engage in a searching inquiry into the viability of 
that theory and the existence of the facts necessary for the theory to succeed.”). 
51. Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 166 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (citing Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 140 (3d Cir. 1998)). 
9
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certification determination as the “defining moment” in class actions, and 
recognized its importance, in that “it may sound the ‘death knell’ of the 
litigation on the part of plaintiffs, or create unwarranted pressure to settle 
nonmeritorious claims on the part of defendants.”52 The court also noted 
that, “in reviewing a motion for class certification, a preliminary inquiry 
into the merits is sometimes necessary to determine whether the alleged 
claims can be properly resolved as a class action.”53 However, the Third 
Circuit clarified its position as to the requirements of class certification
54
 
in a manner similar to how the First Circuit addressed the misperceptions 
of Polymedica in New Motor Vehicles.
55
 
In Hydrogen Peroxide, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit rejected the notion of a “threshold showing” by a party in 
establishing that Rule 23 requirements are met, instead requiring each of 
the requirements to be met by factual determinations using the 
preponderance of the evidence standard.
56
 The court reiterated that it 
“must resolve all factual and legal disputes relevant to class certification, 
even if they overlap with the merits – including disputes touching on 
elements of the cause of action.”57 Finally, and most importantly, the 
Third Circuit held “the court’s obligation to consider all relevant 
evidence and arguments extends to expert testimony, whether offered by 
a party seeking class certification or by a party opposing it.”58 In doing 
so, the court rejected certification of a class of plaintiffs—in an antitrust 
claim alleging price fixing by the manufacturers of hydrogen peroxide—
consisting of all direct purchasers, disavowing its own precedents, which 
provided a presumption, or alternatively, required a minimal showing by 
plaintiffs, that all members of a class of direct purchasers are impacted 
by a price-fixing conspiracy.
59
 The court found that the district court 
 
52. See id. at 162. 
53. Id. at 168-69 (“We must probe beyond the surface of plaintiffs’ allegations in 
performing our review to assess whether plaintiffs’ securities claims satisfy FED. R. CIV. 
P. 23’s requirements.”). 
54. See generally In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
55. See generally New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d 6 (1st Cir. 2008). 
56. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. The Third Circuit was joined by the 
Second and Fifth Circuits in articulating the preponderance of the evidence standard of 
proof. See Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flowserve Corp., 572 F. 3d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 
2009); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 
196, 202 (2d Cir. 2008). 
57. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 307. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. See also Winoff Indus., Inc. v. Stone Container Corp. (In re Linerbard 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss2/9
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failed to consider all relevant evidence and arguments by either party and 
erred when it did not take into consideration the defendant’s contrary 
expert testimony, which showed that half the class suffered no 
injury.
60While the Third Circuit’s move to permit consideration of expert 
testimony by both parties was considered by some legal commentators to 
delve into a “battle of experts,” the court doubled down and further 
stated: “[w]eighing conflicting expert testimony is not only permissible; 
it may be integral to the rigorous analysis Rule 23 demands.”61 The 
decision aligned the Third Circuit with the First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, 
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits in requiring the court to review all relevant 
evidence relating to class certification, including expert testimony and 
regardless of whether it overlaps with the merits of the case.
62
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, relying on 
Gariety, IPO, and its own precedent
63
 requiring a rigorous analysis and 
findings regardless of any overlap with the merits, found a district court 
erred when the court, relying on Eisen, certified a class without properly 
evaluating whether it met the requirements of Rule 23.
64
 Here, the Tenth 
Circuit held that the claims of inmates alleging a “wide range of 
 
Antitrust Litig.), 305 F.3d 145, 164 (3d Cir. 2002) (allowing for impact of all class 
members to be proved thorough expert testimony “supported by charts and studies”); 
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434 (3d Cir. 1977) (providing a “shortcut” or 
presumption of impact by all members of a relevant class of direct purchasers in a price 
fixing conspiracy). 
60. Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 312-27. The court, noting defendants moved 
for but were denied exclusion of the plaintiff’s expert testimony based on the Daubert 
standard, reiterated that whether or not expert testimony is admissible under Daubert or 
any other standard does not determine “whether the district court is satisfied, by all the 
evidence and arguments including all relevant expert opinion, that the requirements of 
Rule 23 have been met. Id. at 315 n.13. 
61. See id. at 312-27. The court, like in Unger, relied on Rule 23’s Advisory 
Committee Notes, which “guide[s] the trial court in its proper task—to consider carefully 
all relevant evidence and make a definitive determination that the requirements of Rule 
23 have been met before certifying a class.” Id. at 320. 
62. See id. See also Brown v. Am. Honda (In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian 
Exp. Antitrust Litig.), 522 F.3d 6, 20-21 (1st Cir. 2008); Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In 
re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006); Blades v. Monsanto 
Co., 400 F.3d 562, 575 (8th Cir. 2005); Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 321 (5th 
Cir. 2005); Gariety v. Grant Thorton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 366 (4th Cir. 2004); West v. 
Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002). 
63. See Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 543 F.3d 597, 613 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Grant Thorton, 368 F.3d at 366) (requiring “findings,” regardless of any 
“overlap with issues on the merits”); Shook v. El Paso Cnty., 386 F.3d 963, 968 (10th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982)) 
(requiring “rigorous analysis”). 
64. Vallario v. Vandehey, 554 F.3d 1259, 1267 (10th Cir. 2009). 
11
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[discriminating and unconstitutional] behavior” against a county sheriff 
failed to allege individual claims “sufficiently similar that they can be 
addressed,” that there was no relationship between the class injuries and 
the injunctive or declaratory relief sought, and that the class thereby 
failed to meet the conditions of Rule 23(b)(2).
65
 Likewise, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has long held that Eisen 
does not limit the court from assuring compliance with Rule 23.
66
 More 
recently, the court held that the district court must “conduct a rigorous 
analysis of the Rule 23 prerequisites before certifying a class.”67 
 
2. Eisen Remains 
 
However, not all circuits agree that such a rigorous and substantial 
review is necessary to assure compliance with Rule 23. The United 
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit retains a staunch 
endorsement of the Eisen rule, and does not consider class certifications 
to require any inquiry into the merits of the case.
68
 Similarly, the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit also views the proposition 
that Eisen permits judges to refuse to “scrutinize” the evidence presented 
to establish the requirements of Rule 23 as “well-settled law.”69 
 
65. See id. at 1267-68. 
66. See Love v. Turlington, 733 F.2d 1562, 1564 (11th Cir. 1984) (“While it is true 
that a trial court may not properly reach the merits of a claim when determining whether 
class certification is warranted, this principle should not be talismanically invoked to 
artificially limit a trial court’s examination of the factors necessary to a reasoned 
determination of whether a plaintiff has met her burden of establishing each of the Rule 
23 class action requirements.”) (internal citations omitted). 
67. Vega v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 564 F.3d 1256, 1266 (11th Cir. 2009). Further, the 
Eleventh Circuit explained that “the trial court can and should consider the merits of the 
case to the degree necessary to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 will be 
satisfied.” Id. 
68. See Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 560 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Lastly, 
Rule 23 does not require a district court, in deciding whether to certify a class, to inquire 
into the merits of the plaintiff’s suit.”); Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d 549, 553 (6th 
Cir. 2006) (quoting Eisen v. Carlise & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177-78 (1974) (“The 
court may ultimately accept or reject this reading of the contract, but a court should not 
‘conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it 
may be maintained as a class action.’”). 
69. See In re Nifedipine Antitrust Litig., No. 08-8014, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 
3643, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 23, 2009) (“[T]he propriety of a district court’s refusal to 
scrutinize the probative value of evidence proffered to demonstrate that the requirements 
of FED. R. CIV. P. 23 are satisfied is well-settled.”) (internal citations omitted); In re Rand 
Corp., No. 02-8007, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 13683, at *2 (D.C. Cir. July 8, 2002) (citing 
Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177). 
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in Blades 
v. Monsanto Co., held that “the preliminary inquiry [at class 
certification] may require the court to resolve” factual and legal disputes, 
even if overlapping with the merits of the case, but “only insofar as 
necessary that the evidence would be sufficient, if the plaintiff’s general 
allegations were accepted as true, to make out a prima facie case.”70 
Invoking Eisen, the court warned: “The closer any dispute at the class 
certification stage comes to the heart of the claim, the more cautious the 
court should be in ensuring that it must be resolved in order to determine 
the nature of the evidence the plaintiff would require.”71 This proposition 
is similar to that which was inferred by the First Circuit in Polymedica 
and later rejected in New Motor Vehicles.
72
 
Further, the court in Blades suggested that such preliminary 
inquiries at class certification do not require such a rigorous review, as 
error in certification may be redressed at a later time in trial after full 
discovery.
73
 Such a proposition would be in conflict with the Rule 23 
Advisory Committee’s notes on the 2003 amendments and a legal 
inverse of the assertion in Unger and Hydrogen Peroxide that authorizes 
full discovery in a court’s attempt to ensure compliance with Rule 23.74 
 
3. Ninth Circuit: Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
 
Still, there is no circuit more difficult than the Ninth Circuit for 
legal commentators to discern a cogent, cohesive, or even continuous, 
legal framework with regards to class certification standards. In Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart, a recent and controversial
75
 decision, the court clarified its 
 
70. 400 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 2005). 
71. Id. (citing Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177-78). 
72. See Brown v. Am. Honda (In re New Motor Vehicles Canadian Exp. Antitrust 
Litig.), 522 F.3d 6, 24-26 (1st Cir. 2008). 
73. Blades, 400 F.3d at 567 (“When the decision on class certification comes before 
full merits discovery has been completed, the court must necessarily conduct this 
preliminary inquiry prospectively. A decision to certify or not to certify a class may 
therefore require revisiting upon completion of full discovery.”). 
74. See Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005). See also In re 
Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008). 
75. See James Beck, Dukes v. Walmart -- On to the Supreme Court, We Hope, 
FORBES (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.forbes.com/sites/docket/2010/04/26/dukes-v-
walmart-on-to-the-supreme-court-we-hope/; Donald M. Falk et al., Dukes v Wal-Mart 
Stores: En Banc Ninth Circuit Lowers the Bar for Class Certification and Creates Circuit 
Splits in Approving Largest Class Action Ever Certified, CPI ANTITRUST J. (Aug. 2010), 
www.appellate.net/articles/TheCPIAntitrustJournal_Aug2010.pdf; Mark Moller, The 
13
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standard in an attempt to “thread the needle” of sufficiently 
homogenizing its decision with the decisions of other circuits, yet still 
distinguishing its decision.
76
 The Ninth Circuit concluded that, although 
the circuits have articulated different standards, they essentially achieve 
the same result.
77
 Further, if there are any differences, the court placed 
itself among “the more rigorous end of [the] spectrum.”78 
The case involved a class of five hundred thousand to 1.5 million 
female employees at Wal-Mart’s thirty-four hundred stores in forty-one 
geographic regions, alleging Title VII gender discrimination in salary 
and promotional opportunities.
79
 The defendant, Wal-Mart, attacked the 
commonality and typicality requirements of the class under Rule 23(a), 
as the class members worked at different levels, for different stores, and 
for different managers and supervisors responsible for salary and 
promotions.
80
 As noted by the dissent, the fact that some of the class 
members were the very supervisors who were perpetrating the alleged 
discrimination created the situation of “placing victims and their alleged 
victimizers on the same side of the counsel table.”81 The court dispensed 
with these arguments at great length, mainly supported by district court 
decisions and selected decisions of other circuits, many of which were 
 
Ninth Circuit’s Controversial New Class Action Decision, CATO @ LIBERTY (Apr. 27, 
2010, 5:05 PM), http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/the-ninth-circuits-controversial-new-
class-action-decision. 
76. See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 581-94 (9th Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). 
77. See id. at 583 (“[D]ifferent circuits have used different words in articulating the 
review necessary, we think . . . . [T]he core holding across circuits . . . is essentially 
unanimous.”). But cf. New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 24 (finding a “spectrum” of the 
degree of analysis required for class certification by the different circuits); Miles v. 
Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.), 471 F.3d 24, 38 (2d Cir. 
2006) (noting the different approaches among circuits regarding the analysis required for 
class certification). 
78. Dukes, 603 F.3d at 584 (quoting New Motor Vehicles, 522 F.3d at 24). 
79. See id. at 577-78. 
80. See id. at 599-615. See also id. at 652 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting) (“Maybe 
there’d be no difference between 500 employees and 500,000 employees if they all had 
similar jobs, worked at the same half-billion square foot store and were supervised by the 
same managers. But the half-million members of the majority’s approved class held a 
multitude of jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart’s hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, 
in 3,400 stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and 
female), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed depending on each class 
member’s job, location and period of employment. Some thrived while others did poorly. 
They have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit.”). 
81. Id. at 630 n.4 (Ikuta, J., dissenting). 
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decided prior to Rule 23’s 2003 Amendments, and CAFA.82 
Wal-Mart also objected to the certification under Rule 23(b)(2), 
which requires the plaintiff to show that the defendant “acted or refused 
to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive 
relief . . . is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.”83 Wal-Mart 
contended that the district court “paid lip service” to the rule, because it 
“does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates 
exclusively or predominantly to money damages.”84 The Ninth Circuit 
dismissed Wal-Mart’s argument by disavowing the two standards for 
determining when monetary relief “predominates” injunctive relief—one 
of which the court’s precedent developed, the district court relied on in 
certifying the class, and the court in Dukes called “fatally flawed.”85 
Instead, the Ninth Circuit espoused a third, different standard for testing 
predominance, which it appropriated directly from Webster’s Collegiate 
Dictionary: “superior [in] strength, influence, and authority.”86 The court 
granted the plaintiff declaratory relief recognizing the company-wide 
gender discrimination at Wal-Mart and injunctive relief stopping further 
discriminatory practices by management, rejecting Wal-Mart’s argument 
that the billions of dollars in monetary claims, including back pay, 
undermined the plaintiff’s assertion.87 
In its petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, Wal-
Mart, contended that this standard is wrong because it creates a three-
way split among the circuits, and encourages plaintiff classes unable to 
meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) to forum shop “in the hopes of 
 
82. See generally id. (majority opinion). 
83. Id. at 615 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2)). 
84. Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note). 
85. Id. at 616. See also Molski v. Gleich, 318 F.3d 937, 949 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(requiring the court to look at the intent of the plaintiff class to determine whether or not 
certification is appropriate); Robinson v. Metro-N. Commuter R.R., 267 F.3d 147, 164 
(2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 430 (5th Cir. 
1998) (Dennis, J., dissenting)) (requiring a balancing test to ensure that the “value to the 
plaintiffs of the injunctive or declaratory relief sought is predominant even though 
compensatory or punitive damages are also claimed.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); Allison, 151 F.3d at 425 (holding claims for monetary relief “predominate 
unless they are incidental to related claims for injunctive or declaratory relief.”). 
86. See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 616 (quoting MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE 
DICTIONARY 978 (11th ed. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
87. See id. at 615-20. But cf. Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(holding that an employment discrimination suit could not be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2) where the final relief related exclusively or predominantly to money damages). 
15
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securing a mandatory certification.”88 In the petition, Wal-Mart asked the 
Supreme Court to settle “[w]hether claims for monetary relief can be 
certified under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2).”89 
 
D.  Aggregate Proof 
 
As class actions involve increasingly complex fact scenarios, the 
use of aggregate proof in class certifications antagonizes and increases 
the variance resulting from circuit splits. Whereas individual claims look 
to evidence at the micro perspective, aggregate proof allows class actions 
to view evidence at the macro level. Aggregate proof is “evidence—
characteristically, in the form of expert submissions involving 
sophisticated statistical or economic analysis—that presumes a view of 
the proposed class.”90 Aggregate proof plays a pivotal role in class 
certification.
91
 Where aggregate proof offered by the plaintiff class 
should show similar wrongs and injuries, the defendant’s aggregate proof 
is likely to show individualized scenarios, making class certification 
impossible.
92
 Moreover, it is often difficult to determine the substantive 
law from which aggregate proof should be viewed.
93
 
Due to technological advances and improved social and economic 
research, aggregate proof plays a large role in the certification process of 
class actions in employment discrimination, securities fraud, antitrust, 
and RICO cases.
94
 After Falcon did away with the across-the-board 
rule,
95
 a plaintiff class seeking to rely on a company-wide discrimination 
claim to survive class certification must produce aggregate proof through 
labor or human resource experts, psychologists, statistics, demographics, 
 
88. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 603 F.3d 
571 (9th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-277). 
89. Id. at i. 
90. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 101 (2009). 
91. Id. at 102 (“The proper role of aggregate proof in class certification is far from a 
mere technicality. The desired effect of aggregate proof is considerable—indeed, well 
nigh decisive—on the class certification question.”). 
92. See id. at 103. 
93. See id. at 104 (quoting McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 552 F.3d 215, 220 (2d 
Cir. 2008)) (“[T]he real concern about aggregate proof in class certification lies in its 
threat ‘to conform the law to the proof.’”). See also Bone & Evans, supra note 12, at 
1271 (“The more controversial cases are those in which the balance between 
commonality and individuality is much closer and the evidence more difficult to 
evaluate.”). 
94. See generally Nagareda, supra note 90, at 115-30, 135-49. 
95. Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). 
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and other relevant data. This is required to show commonality under 
Rule 23(a), and either that the opposing party acted upon the class as a 
whole, as required under Rule 23(b)(2), or that common questions 
predominate over individual ones as necessary for certification under 
Rule 23(b)(3).
96
 
While the fraud-on-the-market doctrine articulated in Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson is still an acceptable and widely used presumption of reliance 
in efficient markets for 10b-5 claims, it does not apply to inefficient 
markets. In order to establish that an efficient market exists, some 
circuits require both aggregate proof (in the form of financial experts, 
economists, auditors and accountants, market data, and pricing), and 
other relevant information (such as loss causation and class-wide reliance 
on the fraud).
97
 Similarly, antitrust law requires aggregate proof relating 
to market pricing and market consequences of the alleged wrong to 
sustain a class action.
98
 RICO claims, similar to securities fraud claims, 
require a showing of reliance and loss causation, generally produced 
through aggregate proof.
99
 
For courts that do not subscribe to the “rigorous analysis” 
requirement of class certification, such as Blades—which accepts the 
plaintiff’s allegations as true and fails to consider conflicting 
testimony—the determination will nearly always result in certification.100 
Similarly, the Second Circuit in IPO rejected the “some showing” 
standard for meeting class certification requirements, as well as the 
notion that expert opinion can satisfy those requirements so long as it is 
not “fatally flawed.”101 
Even among those circuits that subscribe to a meaningful review of 
the evidence at class certification, the use of expert opinions and the 
scrutiny applied by the courts can play a decisive role in whether or not a 
class is certified. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit held that merely hiring a competent expert does not guarantee 
certification for a plaintiff class, but rather the court must consider all 
relevant evidence to determine whether the requirements of Rule 23 are 
met.
102
 When expert testimony is critical to class certification, the 
 
96. See Nagareda, supra note 90, at 150-51. 
97. See id. at 136-41. 
98. See id. at 141-43. 
99. See id. at 143-49. 
100. See Blades v. Monsanto Co., 400 F.3d 562, 567 (8th Cir. 2005). 
101. See Miles v. Merrill Lynch & Co. (In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig.), 471 
F.3d 24, 42 (2d Cir. 2006). 
102. See West v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 282 F.3d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 2002) (“A 
17
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Seventh Circuit has also required consideration of the qualifications, 
reliability, and credibility of expert testimony, and, if the situation 
warrants, performance of a full Daubert analysis.
103
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also 
supports review of expert opinion, dismissing concern of merit-based 
inquiries by noting that determinations at class certification are not 
binding on the ultimate fact-finder.
104
 The Third Circuit went even 
further, stating that admissibility under Daubert does not guarantee that 
courts will or should be satisfied that the requirements of Rule 23 are met 
by all the evidence and arguments—including all relevant expert 
opinions.
105
 However, the Ninth Circuit in Dukes rejected this notion, 
embodied in IPO and Hydrogen Peroxide, stating that expert opinion 
satisfies class certification when it raises a question to be answered by 
the jury.
106
 In contrast to the IPO court, the Dukes court held that, 
because expert testimony was admissible under Daubert, conflicting 
testimony should be evaluated by the ultimate fact-finder.
107
 Such 
disparate frameworks greatly impact whether a class is certified and, 
ultimately, whether the case is dismissed or settled. 
 
E.  Implications of Circuit Split on Class Action Certifications 
 
Certification is nearly always “the defining moment” of a class 
action—where either the plaintiffs’ claim receives the “death knell” and 
is dismissed, or the defendants are forced to settle the case rather than 
face the legal costs and potential damages of a trial.
108
 The broadening 
gap in standards for class certification between circuits poses a real threat 
to the continuity of law, and strains the principles behind class actions—
to “assure fairer outcomes” and prevent “inconsistent or varying” 
standards. There is no doubt that plaintiff classes in circuits with a 
 
district judge may not duck hard questions by observing that each side has some support . 
. . . Tough questions must be faced and squarely decided, if necessary by holding 
evidentiary hearings and choosing between competing perspectives.”). 
103. Am. Honda Motor Co. v. Allen, 600 F.3d 813, 815-16 (7th Cir. 2010). 
104. In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 324 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“Rigorous analysis need not be hampered by a concern for avoiding credibility issues; as 
noted, finding with respect to class certification do not bind the ultimate fact-finder on 
the merits. A court’s determination that an expert’s opinion is persuasive or unpersuasive 
on a Rule 23 requirement does not preclude a different view at the merits stage of the 
case.”). 
105. Id. at 315 n.13. 
106. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 601-4 (9th Cir. 2010). 
107. Id. 
108. See Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310. 
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rigorous analysis face a much greater hurdle in the class certification 
stage than those in circuits that do not require or expressly prohibit any 
preliminary inquiry relating to the merits of the case. 
 
F.  Improvements to the Process 
 
 While the spectrum of standards among circuits does endanger the 
cohesive legal framework of class certifications, there are several 
improvements the courts may consider in reducing or minimizing such 
differences. First, the Supreme Court could seek review of those class 
action certifications that address these issues and provide the circuits 
with additional guidance as it relates to class certification. 
Second, courts should embrace the Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of 
Rule 23’s Advisory Committee note that authorizes full discovery in 
class certification.
109
 While discovery is both time-consuming and costly, 
judges would retain the ability to limit the scope at their discretion and 
would have a greater vantage point to determine whether class 
certification is appropriate. 
Third, because questions of law and fact are so closely intertwined, 
the circuits should consider addressing whether the standard of review 
for class certifications ought to be de novo. As with opening full 
discovery, de novo reviews would be taxing on the circuits. By 
addressing the concerns related to class certification and thus providing 
greater guidance to its district courts, however, the court may reduce the 
number of appeals by. 
There are other tools available to the courts, but some may result in 
increasing fissures among the circuits. By refining the use of Rule 
23(c)(4)—allowing the court to certify a class only to particular issues—
and Rule 23(c)(5)—permitting a class to be divided into subclasses—
courts can ease the problems that arise where the individual claims of 
class members vary to such an extent that certification would be doubtful 
in some circuits.
110
 The use of subclasses and certification of particular 
issues, however, would also provide a “backdoor” certification for 
classes who do not meet the requirements of Rule 23. 
Similarly, application of Rule 23(f) (appeal of a class certification) 
and Rule 23(c)(1)(c) (altering or amending certification order) allows the 
circuits to address the divided decisions of district courts. The use of 
 
109. See Unger v. Amedisys, Inc., 401 F.3d 316 (5th Cir. 2005). 
110. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4)-(5). 
19
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these rules emphasizes, however, that a retroactive review fails to 
provide the viewpoint necessary to achieve a cogent and cohesive legal 
framework. .
111
 And finally, Rule 23(e), which addresses settlement of 
class action claims, is a helpful and frequently used tool of the courts 
(and rightly so), but it should not be used at the expense of justice and 
fairness.
112
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
Class actions were designed to provide adjudication to similarly 
situated plaintiffs and defendants as an alternative to the impracticability 
or inequities of separate, individual actions. Rule 23 and CAFA were 
enacted to “assure fairer outcomes for class members and defendants” 
and prevent “inconsistent or varying” standards between state and federal 
courts. However, the divergent standards applied by the different circuit 
courts with regards to class certification and the use of aggregate proof 
have created an environment that is ripe for manipulation and forum 
shopping by both plaintiffs and defendants, thus imposing the very same 
inequities that the law sought to prevent. 
 
V.  Epilogue  
 
Since the writing of this Article, the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to Wal-Mart on December 6, 2010.
113
 In addition to hearing the 
issue of whether claims for monetary relief can be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2), the Court, sua sponte, directed both parties to brief and argue 
“[w]hether the class certification ordered under Rule 23(b)(2) was 
consistent with Rule 23(a).”114 
In its brief, Wal-Mart argued that “[t]he certification order is flatly 
inconsistent with Rule 23(a)’s prerequisites,” contending that “[t]he 
claims asserted on behalf of millions of individuals do not remotely 
satisfy Rule 23(a)’s commonality, typicality, or adequacy requirements. . 
. . [and s]olely in an effort to satisfy Rule 23(a), the lower courts elected 
to alter the rules — relieving plaintiffs of the burden of proving elements 
of their case, and precluding Wal-Mart from presenting otherwise 
available defenses.”115 Wal-Mart further argued that “the certification 
 
111. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(c), (f). 
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
113. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 795 (2010). 
114. Id. at 795. 
115. Brief for Petitioner at 13, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 
(2011) (No. 10-77). 
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cannot be reconciled with the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2), which is 
limited by its terms to claims for ‘injunctive relief or corresponding 
declaratory relief.’”116 
Nearly thirty amicus briefs were filed. The National Partnership for 
Women & Families, ACLU, NAACP, labor unions, and National 
Employment Lawyers Association wrote in support of the plaintiff-
respondents. The Chamber of Commerce, defense bar associations, trade 
associations for the manufacturing, financial, and securities industries, as 
well as companies like Intel, Altria, and rival Costco, wrote in support of 
Wal-Mart. 
 On June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court issued its decision.
117
 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, noted the significance of the case, 
calling it “one of the most expansive class actions ever.”118 The Court 
began its analysis by stating that class actions are “an exception to the 
usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on behalf of the . . . named 
parties only,” and departure from that rule requires the named plaintiffs 
to “suffer the same injury as the class members.”119 Rule 23(a)’s four 
requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate 
representation, “effectively limit the class claims to those fairly 
encompassed by the named plaintiff’s claims.”120 
Calling commonality “[t]he crux of this case,”121 the Court looked 
to whether there were questions of law or fact common to the class as 
required by Rule 23(a)(2).
122
 The Court recognized the difficulty of this 
determination, noting that “[a]ny competently crafted class complaint 
literally raises common ‘questions.’”123 Still, there must be a “common 
contention . . . . [O]f such a nature that it is capable of 
classwideresolution . . . [and] will resolve an issue that is central to the 
 
116. Id. at 14 (“Rule 23(b)(2)’s text authorizes certification of claims for injunctive 
or corresponding declaratory relief, and is silent as to monetary relief. Monetary claims 
must proceed under Rule 23(b)(3), which provides additional protections for defendants, 
absent class members, and the judicial system.”). 
117. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
118. Id. at 2547. 
119. See id. at 2550 (internal citations omitted). 
120. See id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)). 
121. The Court noted that “commonality and typicality tend to merge,” with “[b]oth 
serv[ing] as guideposts for determining whether . . . the class claims are so interrelated 
that the interests of class members will be fairly and adequately protected in their 
absence.” Id. at 2551 n.5. The Court commented that “[i]n light of [its] disposition of the 
commonality question,” it was unnecessary to address the questions of whether the 
typicality and adequacy requirements of Rule 23(a) were satisfied. Id. 
122. Id. at 2550-51. 
123. Id. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda, supra note 90, at 131-32). 
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validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”124 
 The Court went on to say that “Rule 23 does not set forth mere 
pleading standards,” but rather “a party seeking class certification must 
affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule.”125 Quoting 
Falcon, the Court recognized that “sometimes it may be necessary for the 
court proper to probe behind the pleadings” and held that certification is 
only proper if “the trial court is satisfied, after a rigorous analysis, that 
the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) [are met].”126 The Court conceded that a 
rigorous analysis will frequently “entail some overlap with the merits” of 
the case, but that such occurrence “cannot be helped.”127 Additionally, 
the Court dismissed concerns of the propriety or the novelty of such a 
review, noting that “[t]he necessity of touching aspects of the merits to 
resolve preliminary maters, e.g., jurisdiction and venue, is a familiar 
feature of litigation.”128 
Moreover, the Court attempted to dispel the notion that the holding 
in Eisen precluded courts from conducting an inquiry into the merits to 
determine whether a class should be certified.
129
 The Court pointed out 
that in Eisen, the judge was not conducting his inquiry to determine the 
question of certification, as the class was already certified, but rather to 
shift the cost of notice from the plaintiff to the defendants.
130
 Calling it 
“the purest dictum,” the Court noted that such a contention is 
contradicted by the Court’s other cases.131 
 Looking to the instant case, the Court found that the plaintiff’s 
proof of commonality “necessarily overlaps” with the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claims that Wal-Mart engaged in a pattern or practice of 
discrimination.
132
 Because Wal-Mart had no discriminatory testing 
 
124. Id. (“What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 
‘questions’—even in droves—but rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to 
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities 
within the proposed class . . . impede the generation of common answers.”) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Nagareda, supra note 90, at 132). 
125. Id. at 2551. 
126. Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982)). The 
Court also commented that, “Actual, not presumed, conformance with Rule 23(a) remains 
. . . indispensable.” Id. (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 160). 
127. Id. 
128. Id. at 2552 (citing Szabo v. Bridgeport Mach. Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 676-77 (7th 
Cir. 2001)) (emphasis in original). 
129. See id. at 2552 n.6. 
130. See id. (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 165, 177 (1974)). 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 2552 (“Here respondents wish to sue about literally millions of 
employment decisions at once. Without some glue holding the alleged reasons for those 
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procedure or biased company-wide evaluation methods, the plaintiffs 
were required to show “significant proof that [Wal-Mart] operated under 
a general policy of discrimination . . . [that] manifested itself in hiring 
and promotion practices . . . through entirely subjective decisionmaking 
processes.”133 The Court held that “significant proof” that Wal-Mart 
“operated under a general policy of discrimination” was entirely absent 
from the case.
134
 
 Turning to the evidence presented by the plaintiffs, the Court 
scrutinized the testimony of one of the plaintiff class’ experts, who 
testified that Wal-Mart’s strong corporate culture made it vulnerable to 
gender bias.
135
 The expert failed to show with any specificity how these 
stereotypes played any meaningful role in Wal-Mart’s employment 
decision, even conceding that he could not calculate whether .5 percent 
or 95 percent of Wal-Mart’s decisions were determined by these 
stereotypes.
136
 The Court questioned the trial court’s conclusion that the 
Daubert standard for expert testimony did not apply here, but did not 
actually address it, noting that the expert’s testimony was of little value 
to the case.
137
 The Court noted that the expert’s conclusions were roundly 
criticized the by the very scholars on whom he relied for his analysis.
138
 
 The Court also found that plaintiffs failed to establish 
commonality of how the discretion of managers at Wal-Mart was 
exercised.
139
 Due to Wal-Mart’s sheer size and geography, the Court 
viewed with skeptism the contention that all managers exercised 
discretion in a common way without some type of common direction.
140
 
Plaintiffs’ statistical evidence showing disparities between men and 
women at Wal-Mart also failed to prove discrimination on a class-wide 
basis because it disregards other contributing factors such as regional pay 
disparity andCourt found that the anecdotal evidence of discrimination 
 
decisions together, it will be impossible to say that examination of all the class members’ 
claims for relief will produce a common answer to the crucial question why was I 
disfavored.”) (emphasis in original). 
133. Id. at 2553 (quoting and citing Gen. Tel. Co. of the Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 
147, 159 n.15 (1982)). 
134. Id. 
135. See id. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. at 2553-54 (“The District Court concluded that Daubert did not apply to 
expert testimony at the certification stage of class-action proceedings. We doubt that is 
so, but even if properly considered, [the expert’s] testimony does nothing to advance 
respondents’ case.”) (internal citations omitted). 
138. See id. at 2553 n.8. 
139. See id. at 2554-55. 
140. See id. at 2555. 
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submitted by the plaintiff did not give rise to a showing of a general 
policy of discrimination by Wal-Mart.
141
 The majority concluded its 
analysis of the class certification under Rule 23(a) by agreeing with 
Chief Judge Kozinski’s statement that the plaintiffs “have little in 
common but their sex and this lawsuit.”142 
 The dissent, authored by Justice Ginsberg, contended that the 
majority “import[ed] into the Rule 23(a) determination concerns properly 
addressed in a Rule 23(b)(3) assessment.”143 Further, it stated that “[t]he 
Court blend[ed] Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with the more 
demanding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevate[ed] the [Rule] 
(a)(2) inquiry so that it [wa]s no longer ‘easily satisfied.’”144 Moreover, 
“[t]he Court [gave] no credence to the key dispute common to the class: 
whether Wal–Mart’s discretionary pay and promotion policies [we]re 
discriminatory.”145 Finally, the dissent found that the majority’s 
“emphasis on differences between class members mimic[ked] the Rule 
23(b)(3) inquiry into whether common questions ‘predominate’ over 
individual issues,” thus “duplicat[ing] [Rule] 23(b)(3)’s question whether 
‘a class action is superior’ to other modes of adjudication.”146 
However, the Court unanimously agreed that monetary claims for 
relief cannot be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).
147
 The Court noted that 
Rule 23(b)(2) requires that the opposing party act or refuse to act on 
grounds applying to the class generally, so that injunctive or declaratory 
relief is appropriate to the class a whole.
148
 The Court declined to address 
whether Rule 23(b)(2) “applies only to requests for such injunctive or 
declaratory relief,” holding that “at a minimum, claims for individualized 
relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not satisfy the Rule.”149 
The Court cited Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., and its 
proposition that classes that seek monetary relief may be certified under 
 
141. See id. at 2556 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 
n.15 (1982)) (“Even if every single one of these accounts is true, that would not 
demonstrate that the entire company ‘operates under a general policy of discrimination,’ 
which is what respondent must show to certify a companywide class.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
142. Id. at 2557 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 652 (9th 
Cir. 2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)). 
143. Id. at 2562 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
144. Id. at 2565 (citing 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 
23.23 (3d ed. 2011)). 
145. Id. 
146. Id. at 2566. 
147. Id. at 2557 (majority opinion). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
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Rule 23(b)(2) if the damages are “‘incidental’” or “‘flow directly’ from 
liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming the basis of the 
injunctive or declaratory relief.”150 The Allison court further stated that 
“’incidental damage should not require additional hearings to resolve the 
disparate merits of each individual’s case; it should neither introduce 
new substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex individualized 
determinations.’”151 The Court did not decide whether a class certified 
under Rule 23(b)(2) may claim incidental monetary relief, as in Allison, 
but noted that the plaintiffs would fail to meet such a standard because 
“Wal-Mart [wa]s entitled to individualized determinations of each 
employee’s eligibility for backpay,” which would require additional 
hearings or complex individualized determinations.
152
 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dukes provides greater clarity to 
the lower courts in determining the appropriateness of class certification. 
The lower courts now must engage in a rigorous analysis to determine 
whether the class satisfies the requirements of Rule 23 before class 
certification, even if it entails some overlap with the merits.
153
 It also 
places the burden of proof at certification squarely upon the party 
seeking certification, who must affirmatively demonstrate compliance 
with the Rule.
154
 Further, the Court indicated that expert testimony must 
meet the Daubert standards.
155
 
Moreover, the degree of detail at which the Court reviewed the facts 
surrounding certification may serve as model for the lower courts in 
deciding the question of class certification. While this approach may 
result in an increased use of aggregate proof by both parties in an attempt 
to defend or attack the certification of a class, the Court’s scrutiny of 
statistical and anecdotal evidence provides greater assurance that broad 
conclusions and generalities will not satisfy the requirements of Rule 23. 
Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Dukes was able to reduce the 
“inconsistent and varying standards” for which the Rule was 
promulgated to prevent. By eliminating disparities among the lower 
courts, the Supreme Court strengthened the purpose of CAFA in 
“assur[ing] fairer outcome for class members and defendants.”156 
 
150. Id. at 2560 (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.,151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th 
Cir. 1998)). 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. See id. at 2551. 
154. See id. 
155. Id. at 2553-54. 
156. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4 (2006)). 
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